Of brokers and bureaucrats: Clientelism, social policy, and intra-party political dynamics in modern Argentina.

Date Presented:

February 6

Abstract:

This thesis attempts to understand recent changes in political strategies and distributive policies by Argentina’s ruling Peronist Party; shifting from heavy reliance on clientelism—for example, vote buying and patronage—toward broad-based, programmatic, and universal-social programs such as conditional cash transfers. In pursuing these universal voter-linkages, the Peronists seem to have risked undermining their own political viability since much of their support traditionally comes from clientelistic exchanges. However, through qualitative interviews with politicians, brokers, journalists, voters, and other political actors, I demonstrate that this move from clientelism is not strictly about expanding political support overall, but also an attempt by the president to centralize power and support within the traditionally fragmented party and prevent defections by fellow party members. In doing so, I use the Argentine case to challenge previous scholarship on the issue, which generally considers moving away from clientelism solely as an inter-party electoral strategy. With a new three-part model of clientelism—delineating politician, machine, and voter—I demonstrate how decisions to employ either clientelist or universalist strategies are not simply made by “unitary-actor” political parties, but can also be the result of intra-party dynamics, competition, and power struggles.