Citation:
Date Presented:
February 5Abstract:
The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué propelled the United States’ China policy shift towards rapprochement, enabling the US to play the “China card” against the USSR and shape the balance of power in Asia. Many consider this to be the crucial turning point for China’s opening to the world and for détente within the Cold War international system. Nevertheless, few scholars and members of the public emphasize the contributions of French diplomats and leaders, including French President Charles de Gaulle, Lucien Paye, and Edgar Faure. In 1964, France shocked the world by becoming the first western European country to normalize relations with China at an ambassadorial level, subsequently playing a pivotal role as well in the UN recognition of the PRC in 1971.
In this thesis I examine how these French ministers and diplomats consistently encouraged and facilitated Sino-American rapprochement in both diplomatic and high-level discussions with their American and Chinese counterparts throughout the 1960s. In the process of shaping Sino-American relations, The French were able to pursue their own national interests of constructing multipolarity in a Cold War system shifting into détente, aided in no small part by a similar set of Chinese preferences for a diffusion of power away from the US and the USSR. The logic behind French and Chinese attitudes towards multipolarity helps us understand why the US took a relatively long span of time—and a change in administration—to realize the potential of the “China card” and the stability that could be offered by multipolarity.