Citation:
Date Presented:
February 6Abstract:
In my thesis, I examine military justice reform legislation in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. Specially, I seek to explain why the United States is alone among its major democratic allies, including the United Kingdom and Canada, in maintaining a command-centric military justice system amidst a global trend of military justice reform. I propose a two-tiered institutional model within which to contextualize US non-reform. First, the US Constitution delegates the power to regulate the military to Congress, leaving the Supreme Court unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of the military justice system. Without a judicial mandate for reform, civilian legislators are unlikely to take an interest in the obscure subject of military law. Second, the presidential structure of American democracy generates distrust between the military and legislators who may draft military justice reform bills. Without an institutional link that ensures communication between the two bodies–as would be found in a parliamentary democracy, in which the defense ministry drafts reform legislation– disagreements between the military and Congress may descend into public opposition and debate, complicating the passage of potential bills.
My research addresses two important topics within the scholarly literature. In the context of military law, it examines the political processes by which military justice reform is drafted and passed and adds to the current literature, which focuses solely on judicial rulings. More generally, it considers how civil-military relations in developed democracies may be shaped by the presidential or parliamentary nature of their governments.