Papers

In situations where other states behave non-cooperatively, governments need to decide whether to accommodate or take a tough stance against this behavior. In doing so, they face an “accommodation dilemma”: Even though a tough stance can be materially costly, governments have incentives to sanction and not accommodate non-cooperative behavior for reputational reasons. However, bringing voters on board with this approach can be challenging. This paper examines to which extent the trade-off between the material benefits of cooperation and reputational considerations influences the extent to which citizens are willing to support a tough and materially costly response. Using survey experiments embedded in real-life contexts, it examines how voters respond to the accommodation dilemma across three types of non- cooperative behavior: a) cherry-picking attempts and non-compliance, b) serious violations of international law and c) coercive bargaining in international negotiations. Across all cases, the experiments show that highlighting the reputational risks associated with accommodation tends to make voters less willing, and highlighting the material consequences of non-accommodation more willing, to compromise. Dilemma situations, in contrast, are difficult: Sometimes the willingness not to accommodate is strengthened when both types of cost are emphasized, sometimes muted. Overall, the paper shows that voters understand strategic foreign policy considerations and care about their country’s reputation beyond the security realm.

State formation depends not only on demand-side factors, such as military competition, but also, fundamentally, on the supply of ideas and techniques in a society. We argue that these ideas can sometimes come from unexpected quarters before then being adopted by those who rule. Using prefecture level data for China during the Tang (618-906 CE) and Northern Song (960- 1127 CE) dynasties, we show how woodblock printing techniques first developed by Buddhists in competition with Taoists and Confucians provided for a technology that could give a broad number of people access to the written word. This was critical for the development and expansion of the Imperial Examination system, which aided in constructing a state bureaucracy. In Medieval Western Europe, by contrast, the religious monopoly held by the Catholic Church gave it little incentive to develop new techniques to broaden access to the written word. This then helped contribute to the political divergence between China and Western Europe, as European rulers seeking to construct a bureaucracy had a more limited pool of talent to draw upon. The broader lesson here is that in order to better understand state formation, we may need to consider the incentives for social actors outside the state itself to develop new techniques.

This paper presents a theory of policymaking at the federal and state levels where individuals locate in states based on state policies. Individuals have a productivity and an ideology that represents the strength of preferences for redistribution and social policy. States and the federal government choose a tax rate, spending on redistribution or a public good, and social policy. Individuals choose how much to work and in which state to reside. States and individuals separate with a high tax state that redistributes attracting individuals with lower productivity and stronger ideology and a low tax state that provide the public good and attracts individuals with higher productivity and weaker ideology. Polarization is thus natural and originates in the states. Sorting implies that states are politically noncompetitive. The federal government is divided and bargains over a tax rate, spending, and social policy. A new form of gridlock emerges as the federal government declines enacting a social policy, allowing each state to enact its own policy. Gridlock reinforces the sorting among the states and amplifies polarization. Gridlock is welfare-enhancing but divisive. Gridlock does not occur on economic policy. Recent Supreme Court cases increased the space for social policy gridlock.

We investigate the relationship between armed groups and large-scale mining firms in the Democratic Republic of Congo using geo-referenced data over 2000-2015. We start by showing that the pattern of links between armed bands and concession owners significantly departs from the random bench- mark, even after accounting for geographic proximity. After observing a given owner-band pair in a concession, we are significantly more likely to find the same pair in a different concession, possibly far away. We next explore the nature of the interaction by focusing on the timing and on the type of violence exerted by armed groups, and by exploring how it varies with local population density. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that mining companies and armed bands engage in repeated interactions, where the latter help clear the territory from competing armed bands and destabilize the surrounding environment in a way that potentially allows to access cheaper labor.

Abstract: A sudden, large, and unanticipated change in the supply of a crucial factor of production (land, labor, physical or human capital) unleashes social and political turmoil. Returns to a previously scarce factor fall if it suddenly becomes abundant; returns to a previously abundant one rise if it suddenly becomes scarce. Societies typically adjust to such a shock in any of four ways, each more difficult than the one before it: factor substitution, factor mobility, a factor-saving technology, or coercion. I focus on cases in which societies and governments respond to the same shock in opposite ways. Faced with a sudden shortage of labor, one society may shift to less labor-intensive production, while its neighbor uses coercion to suppress workers. Faced with a sudden loss of access to land, some societies will move to technologies that exploit their newly abundant endowments of human or physical capital, or of labor, while others seek to conquer and colonize adjacent lands. In historical case studies, I show how such factors as soil and climate, previous experience of privation, and technological breakthroughs can determine which course a society takes.

The federalism structure of the US government requires active cooperation from state gov- ernments to successfully enforce federal environmental regulations. What explains state gov- ernments’ participation in lawsuits against firms that are accused of violating major environ- mental statutes? We argue that firms’ political connections with state politicians affect a state government’s decision to join the litigation process. By constructing a novel dataset on the EPA’s civil cases and settlements for the period 1998-2021, we show that state environmental agencies are less likely to join the EPA in court when the defendant firms contributed to Re- publican state legislators. We do not find the same pattern when firms have connections with Democratic legislators. We also show that state involvement in litigation is associated with higher penalties as well as more environmental provisions in judicial outcomes. Our findings highlight how state politics can be an avenue for firms to exert influence on federal regulations.

In their study of the economics of labor coercion, Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) proposed a theoretical argument to unify two mechanisms that scholars had long thought contradicted each other: a labor demand effect, by which the elite coerces labor when supply is scarce, and an outside option effect, by which labor scarcity and better outside options for the workers undermine coercive arrangements. We build a new data set of roll-call votes on 1884-1888 eman- cipation bills in the Brazilian legislature, and we find that both mechanisms played a role in building the coalition that eventually abolished slavery.

This paper investigates the empirical relationship between inclusion and state ca- pacity, as theorized by Besley and Persson (2009). We examine the impact of racial discrimination on Black U.S. military enlistment during the onset of WWII. We find that discrimination had a large and negative effect on volunteer enlistment after the Pearl Harbor attack. The result is robust to a large number of controls that account for potential confounders. The negative effect of discrimination is moderated by geograph- ical proximity to Pearl Harbor, and is larger for educated men. We provide consistent evidence for Japanese Americans.

We compare electoral outcomes under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). Candidates compete by choosing platforms that can either mobilize their core supporters, or instead attract undecided voters. RCV exacerbates platform polarization in contexts of low voter engagement, strong partisan attachments, and imbalances in the candidates’ share of core supporters. RCV may increase or decrease voter turnout relative to plurality rule, and strong partisan attachments increase the likelihood that the winning candidate receives a minority of votes cast.