Regime Type and Military Decision Making in China, Vietnam, India, and Pakistan

Abstract:

My thesis examines how a country's domestic institutions—its regime type—influences its military decision making. In particular, I compare the military decision making of India, Pakistan, China, and Vietnam, during the First Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979. During these three border disputes, these states displayed varying approaches to military decision making: India and Pakistan, on the one hand, were overtly concerned with maintaining territorial control and security over their states. China and Vietnam, however, often made puzzling security decisions, focusing more on “punitive strikes” and political objectives than on territory or military victory. What can explain these variations in military decision making? I hypothesize that regime type determined these states’ respective security objectives: the leaders of the Marxist-Leninist party-states Vietnam and China predominantly sought security for their regimes while leaders in democratic India and Pakistan prioritized “state security,” which included the defense of their countries’ territory and people. Thus, this thesis examines “state security” and “regime security” as frameworks that can explain different regime types’ approaches to conflict. I implore both quantitative and qualitative methods to test the viability of my hypothesis in explaining state action. As this thesis is a work in progress, I would be grateful for any feedback on how I can best frame and define these two security frameworks.